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6.1  Introduction 
It is often said that the United States is a country of immigrants. Today, 
a better description is that the United States is a country of the descen- 
dants of immigrants.’ The upsurge in immigration that began in the mid- 
1960s is now raising the relative numbers of immigrants and recent descen- 
dants of immigrants and shifting the balance back  toward the patterns 
that  prevailed earlier in the country’s history-especially  in the major 
immigrant-receiving states like California, Texas, and Florida. As was the 
case with the last big  surge of immigration  at the turn of  the century, 
recent immigrant inflows have stimulated a wave of research and policy 
initiatives. Much of the new research focuses on the changing composition 
of immigrant inflows and on the apparent decline in the relative economic 
status of immigrants.’ Perhaps more important from the long-run point of 
view,  however, is  the changing economic status of the “second genera- 
tion”-the  offspring of immigrant parents, who now make up 10 percent 
of all native-born children, and whose own children will constitute a sig- 
nificant fraction of the future population. 
David Card is the Class of 1950 Professor of Economics at the University of California, 
Berkeley, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. John Di- 
Nardo is associate professor of  economics at the University of California, Irvine, and a 
research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Eugena Estes is a graduate 
student of economics at Princeton University. 
The authors thank seminar participants at the NBER and McMaster University for com- 
ments. Card’s research was funded in part by a grant from the NICHD. 
1. For example, only about 7 percent of adult household heads interviewed in the General 
Social Survey between 1977 and 1996 are immigrants, but 40 percent report having at least 
one foreign-born grandparent. 
2. See, e.g., Borjas (1985, 1987, 1995). 
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While there is some research on the “new” second generation, a major 
stumbling block  has been  the absence (since the  1970 census) of large- 
scale data sets that identify the native-born children of immigrants.? This 
gap has been filled very recently by the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
which added questions on parents’ place of birth in  1994. In this paper, 
we use the recent CPS data together with data from earlier censuses to 
provide a comparative perspective on the economic performance of immi- 
grants and native-born childrcn of immigrants in 1940, 1970, and today. 
We also use cohort-level data for different immigrant groups to measure 
the rate  of  “intergenerational  assimilation”  between  immigrant  fathers 
and second-generation  sons and daughters and to evaluate recent argu- 
ments  that intergenerational  assimilation  has  slowed down  because  of 
changes in the ethnic composition of immigrant  inflows and changes in 
the structure of the U.S. ec~nomy.~ 
As our title suggests, our findings reflect a mixture of change and con- 
stancy. On the one hand, we  find that the well-documented  shifts in the 
origin countries of U.S. immigrants have been associated with a decline in 
the relative economic status of immigrants as a whole between  1940 and 
the  mid-1990s. We  also find  some evidence  of  a decline in  the relative 
status of the second generation, although this is mainly confined to the 
lower deciles of the wage distribution. At the middle and upper deciles, 
there is little indication  of a shift. On the other hand, we  find that the 
degree  of intergenerational  assimilation  (measured  by  intergenerational 
correlations in education or earnings, or by interethnic marriage patterns) 
has not declined systematically between the cohort of second-generation 
children raised in the 1940s and 1950s and those raised in the 1960s and 
1970s. Moreover, as in the past, second-generation children continue to 
have higher education and wages than children of comparable US.-born 
parents. 
6.2  Background 
The changing characteristics of the immigrant  and second-generation 
populations in our sample period (1940-95)  reflect the dramatic changes 
in  U.S.  immigration policy  over the  twentieth century, as well as other 
powerful forces, such as world wars, the Great Depression, political  and 
economic upheavals in Europe, and rapid population growth in the Amer- 
ica~.~  These various influences are revealed in figure 6.1, which plots an- 
nual immigrant inflow rates (the number of documented immigrant arriv- 
als divided by the population) from 1900 to 1990. Most of the immigrants 
3. See Waldinger and Perlmann (1997) for a review of much of this literature. 
4.  This argument is advanced in Gans (1992) and Portes and Zhou (1993); also see Wal- 
5. There are many histories of U.S. immigration; see, for example, Bennett (1963). 
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Fig. 6.1  Immigrant inflow rate, 1900-1990 
in our 1940 sample had arrived during the massive wave of immigration 
between  1880 and  1925 and were the “new” immigrants  of their time. 
Many of these were from Russia, Eastern Europe, and Italy and were con- 
sidered less “desirable” than earlier immigrants from the United Kingdom 
and Northern Europe.6 A variety of forces, including populist sentiment 
against immigration, business opposition stimulated by labor unrest, and 
the patriotic fervor surrounding the entry of the United States into World 
War I, led to reductions in immigration during the 1910-20  period. After 
the war, immigration rates surged, leading to renewed demands for restric- 
tive legislation, which culminated in the Immigrant and Nationality Acts 
of  1924. These laws capped immigrant inflows and set out the national- 
origin quotas that were the cornerstone of immigration policy until the 
1960s.’ The effects of the immigrant restrictions are also evident in figure 
6.1: Immigrant inflows fell from an average of about 600,000 per year in 
the early 1920s to about one-half that rate in the late 1920s. With the onset 
of  the Great Depression, immigrant inflows dropped  below 50,000 per 
year by  1932 and remained at similar levels throughout the 1930s. 
By contrast, the characteristics  of the immigrants in our 1970 census 
6. For example, Brigham (1923) developed estimates of the racial composition of immi- 
grants from different source countries. He divided immigrants into four racial categories: 
“Nordic,” “Alpine,” “Mediterranean,” and “Asian.” His analysis suggested that “Alpine” and 
“Mediterranean” immigrants had lower “intelligence” than “Nordic” immigrants, and on 
this basis, he argued for limiting immigration from countries with a high fraction of individu- 
als of Mediterranean descent, like Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. 
7.  There was little confusion about the intent of the policy. A Los Angeles Times headline 
at the time (13 April 1924) read: “Nordic Victory is seen in Drastic Restrictions.” 230  David Card, John DiNardo, and Eugena Estes 
sample reflect the results of the post-1924 restrictions, together with post- 
war economic and political changes. Indeed, apart from the 1952 McCar- 
ran-Walter Acts, which extended special preferences to immigrants with 
skills deemed urgently needed and put further restrictions on those with 
“mental, physical, and moral defects,” there was comparatively little change 
in immigration law from 1940 until 1965. Nevertheless, even in this envi- 
ronment the composition of immigrant inflows shifted somewhat, resulting 
(for example) in a much higher fraction of Mexican immigrants in  1970 
than  1  940.8 In  addition,  refugee  arrivals-particularly  from  Cuba- 
changed the face of immigration over the period 1925-65. 
Finally, the characteristics of our sample of immigrants from the 1990s 
reflect the influence of the 1965 Immigration  Reform Act, which elimi- 
nated  national-origin  quotas and extended special preferences to those 
with family members already in the United States. This act is widely cred- 
ited with allowing higher inflow rates and with changing the countries of 
origin of the “new new” immigrants-away  from Europe and toward Asia 
and South and Central America. 
The characteristics of the second-generation populations in our sample 
period also reflect past immigration policies, albeit with a “generational 
lag.”  Thus, the second generation in our 1940 sample-who  were born 
between 1875 and 1920-are  a mixture of the children of the “old” (pre- 
1890) immigrants and the “new” immigrants of the turn of the century. 
The second generation in our 1970 sample are largely the children of the 
immigrants who entered the United States during the period 1890-1925; 
as such, many are the descendants of families who at least began their 
lives in the United States in relative deprivation (see Waldinger and Perl- 
mann 1997). Finally, the second generation in the mid-1990s are a mixture 
of children of pre-1965 immigrants; children of Cuban, Hungarian, and 
Czech refugees; and children of the initial wave of post-1965 immigrants. 
6.3  Data Sources and Definitions 
6.3.1  Sources 
The data for our empirical analysis are taken from the 1940 and 1970 
censuses and from pooled  1994, 1995, and 1996 March Current Popula- 
tion Surveys. The 1940 census collected information on immigrant status, 
education, and earnings for all individuals, but it only collected informa- 
tion on parents’ place of birth for one “sample line” person in each house- 
hold. Thus, most of our analysis for 1940 utilizes the sample-line persons, 
8. Some of the Mexican inflow can be traced to other aspects of U.S. immigration policy, 
including the Bracero program, which ended in 1964. The More Things Change  231 
although we also use the full sample of individual records in analyzing the 
earnings of immigrant fathers. 
The 1970 census collected information on both parents’ immigrant sta- 
tus and on one parent’s place of birth in one of the two versions of the 
“long form”-the  so-called 15 percent sample form. Thus, most of  our 
analysis for 1970 utilizes the 1-in-100 15 percent state samples, although 
when analyzing the earnings of immigrant fathers, we  also use observa- 
tions in the 1-in-100 5 percent state sample. 
Finally, since 1994, the March Current Population Survey has included 
questions on the place of birth of each individual and his or her parents. 
Because of the relatively small number of observations in the CPS (com- 
pared to the census), we pool information from the 1994, 1995, and 1996 
CPSS.~  We  convert the reported  earnings information from these three 
samples into constant 1995 dollars prior to pooling the data. 
6.3.2  Definitions 
Throughout this paper we distinguish between three mutually exclusive 
groups: immigrants, individuals born in the U.S. of immigrant parents (the 
second generation), and others. For simplicity, we refer to the last group 
as the “third and higher generation,” or sometimes as “natives.” In the 
1970 and 1994-96  samples, we  exclude from the immigrant  subsample 
individuals who were born abroad of U.S. parents, and include them in- 
stead with the third-and-higher-generation  group.’O We  also restrict the 
definition  of  the  second  generation  to  native-born  individuals  whose 
mother and father were immigrants. This requirement  substantially nar- 
rows the second-generation group relative to the alternative of requiring 
only one immigrant parent. In particular, among adults with at least one 
immigrant parent, 69 percent had two immigrant parents in the 1940 cen- 
sus, 58 percent had two immigrant parents in the 1970 census, and only 
40 percent had two immigrant parents in the 1994-96 CPS. 
9. We  make no adjustments for the overlapping samples in consecutive March surveys. 
About 40  percent of  individuals  in each March survey  are resurveyed in the following 
March, and 40 percent were surveyed in the previous year (the other 20 percent are people 
who either moved into their house in the past  12 months or will move out in the next  12 
months). This feature means that our standard errors using the CPS sample are understated 
by about 17 percent. 
10. In the 1994-96  March CPS files, about 8 percent of individuals age 16-66  who were 
born abroad reported that they had U.S.  parents. This is particularly prevalent for individuals 
born in a few countries, including France (34 percent), Germany (49 percent), England (19 
percent), Japan (34 percent), and Canada (22 percent). The fraction of individuals born 
abroad who had U.S. parents in the 1970 census is comparable to the fraction in the mid- 
1990s (9.5 percent). In the 1940 census, we experimented with attempting to exclude individ- 
uals born abroad of U.S. parents from the foreign-born pool but found that the resulting 
sample excluded an unusually high fraction of people from some countries. 232  David Card, John DiNardo, and Eugena Estes 
6.4  Comparisons of Natives, Immigrants, and the Second Generation 
6.4.1  Descriptive Overview 
We begin our empirical analysis with a descriptivc overview of the dem- 
ographic characteristics and labor market outcomes of the three genera- 
tional groups in 1940, 1970, and 1994496. Panel A of table 6. l presents a 
variety of data for adult men in the three data sets, while panel B presents 
comparable data for adult women. Examination of the top row of either 
panel shows the rather large swings in the relative sizes of the three groups 
that have occurred in the past SO years. The fraction of immigrants in the 
adult population of the United States was about 12 percent in  1940, fell 
to 5 percent in 1970, and has risen back to about 11 percent in the mid- 
1990s. Following this pattern, but with a generational lag, the second gen- 
eration’s share of the adult population has fallen steadily from 16 percent 
in  1940 to 8 percent in 1970 and to 3 percent today. 
The changing relative sizes of the three groups were accompanied by 
notable shifts in their age compositions.  In  1940, immigrants were rela- 
tively old (reflecting the very low immigrant  inflows between  1925 and 
1940), while the second and third-and-higher generations had similar age 
structures. In 1970, both immigrants and the second generation were older 
than natives, with over a I0-year gap in the average age of the second gen- 
eration relative to natives. The long-lasting effects of the  1925 Immigra- 
tion Act are revealed by the very small number of second-generation men 
or women in the 16-30-year  age range in  1970. The resumption  of sub- 
stantial immigrant inflows in the 1970s and 1980s is manifested in the 1990s 
data by  a reversal of the relative ages of immigrants and natives, and by 
the relatively high fraction of the second generation in the youngest age 
range. 
Although not identical, the relative distributions of education for the 
native-born,  immigrants, and the second generation are roughly  similar 
for men and women. In all three years of our sample, education levels are 
lowest for immigrants  and are roughly  similar between  natives and the 
second generation. Interestingly, the mean schooling gap between immi- 
grants and the third-and-higher generation has narrowed slightly over the 
past 50 years: from 1.9 years in 1940 to 1.4 years in 1994496 for men; and 
from 2.5 years in 1940 to 1.4 years in 1994-96  for women. Paradoxically, 
this convergence in means has occurred at the same time that the immi- 
grant-native gap in the fraction of men or women in the lowest education 
category has actually rism slightly. 
The labor market outcomes in the middle rows of table 6.1 show that 
native, second generation, and immigrant men have fairly similar employ- 
ment rates. The one exception to this pattern-the  low employment rate 
of  second  generation  men  in  1994-96-is  largely  an  artifact  of  the Table 6.1  Characteristics of Natives, Immigrants, and Second-Generation  Individuals in 1940,1970, and 1994% 
1940  1970  1994 96 
Natives 
Fraction of population 
Mean age (years) 
Fractions in age range 
16  30 years 
3 145  years 
46-66  years 
Mean years education 
Fractions in education range 
<  12 years education 
12 years education 
13-1  5 years education 




of weekly wage 
overall wage quartiles 
Quartile 1 
Quartile 2 
Fraction worked last 
Mean annual earnings 
Mean weekly wage 
Coefficient of variation 
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A. Men Age 16-66 
0.16  0.87 
35.8  36.4 
0.43  0.42 
0.32  0.28 
0.26  0.30 
9.2  11.2 
0.74  0.44 
0.16  0.31 
0.05  0.14 
0.05  0.12 
0.82  0.89 
11,910  24,683 
303.6  635.1 
0.64  0.63 
0.17  0.27 
















































































0.22 Table 6.1  (continued) 
1940  1970  1994-96 
2nd  2nd  2nd 















country of birth 
Sample size 
Fraction of population 
Mean age (years) 
Fractions in age range 
16-30  years 
31-45  years 
46-66  years 















Fractions in education range 
















0.29  0.24  0.24 
0.28  0.24  0.28 
0.53  0.65  0.72 
0.91  0.93  0.27 
0.09  0.02  0.57 
-  0.05  0.16 
~  -  0.09 
23,928  519,644  29,812 
B.  Women Age 16-66 
0.16  0.86  0.06 
35.7  36.9  42.4 
0.43  0.41  0.26 
0.31  0.28  0.30 
0.26  0.31  0.43 
9.2  11.2  10.0 




























































0.19 12 years education  0.21 
13-15  years education  0.07 
161- years education  0.04 
year  0.31 
(1995s)  2,287 
(1995s)  172.5 
of weekly wage  0.79 
wage quartiles 
Quartile 1  0.29 
Quartile 2  0.25 
Quartile 3  0.23 
Quartile 4  0.23 
characteristics 
Fraction married  0.61 
Nativity of spouse of 
married individuals 
Native"  0.97 
Immigrant  0.03 
Second 
Second 
Fraction worked last 
Mean annual earnings 
Mean weekly wage 
Coefficient of variation 
Fraction of workers in overall 
Marital status and spouse 
generation  - 
generation with 
matching father's 
country of birth  - 







































































































0.27  0.31 
0.20  0.30 
0.20  0.20 
0.59  0.64 
9,912  12,156 
383.6  431.8 
0.82  0.81 
0.26  0.25 
0.30  0.23 
0.22  0.22 
0.21  0.30 
0.62  0.47 
0.20  0.61 
0.76  0.17 
0.04  0.22 
0.02  0.14 
17,814  4,769 
"In 1940 sample, native spouses include second generation. In later samples, native spouses exclude second generation. 236  David Card, John DiNardo, and Eugena Estes 
U-shaped age distribution of this group.” Among women the  differences are 
more pronounced: Immigrant women, in particular,  have lower employ- 
ment rates than either second- or third-and-higher-generation women.’* 
A variety of earnings information is presented in table 6.1, including 
mean annual earnings (for both workers and nonworkers), average weekly 
earnings (for workers only), and the fractions of each generational group 
in different aggregate wage quartiles.I3  Looking first at men, the 1940 data 
show roughly  25 percent higher annual earnings and 15 percent  higher 
weekly wages for immigrants and the second generation than for natives. 
The second generation-native gap is particularly noteworthy because the 
two  groups have  similar age distributions,  whereas  some of  the higher 
wages of immigrants are presumably attributable to their older age. The 
1970 data again show higher earnings for immigrants and the second gen- 
eration than for natives, although these comparisons must be interpreted 
carefully given the different age distributions of the three groups. By com- 
parison, immigrants have the lowest annual or weekly earnings of the three 
generational groups in the 1994-96  data. Indeed, over one-third of immi- 
grant men have weekly wages in the bottom quartile of the overall wage 
distribution. The same general patterns hold for women, although the per- 
centage wage differentials  between the generational  groups are typically 
smaller than those for men. Moreover, immigrant women are far less con- 
centrated at the bottom of the overall wage distribution in the mid-1990s 
than their male counterparts. 
The final rows of table 6.1 present  information  on an alternative di- 
mension of “success” in the United States: the rate at which members of 
different generational groups marry outside their own group. Not surpris- 
ingly, spouses of  third-and-higher-generation men  and women  are very 
likely to also be third-and-higher generation. Likewise, the spouses of im- 
migrants are most likely to be immigrants, although the fraction of immi- 
grants married to natives varies over our sample period. In particular, the 
larger cohorts of immigrants in 1940 and the 1990s are more likely to have 
immigrant spouses-64  percent and 8 1 percent, respectively, for men, and 
76 percent in both 1940 and 1994-96 for women. The marriage patterns of 
the second generation are perhaps the most interesting. Second-generation 
men and women in 1970 and 1994-96  were typically married to natives 
(i.e., third-and-higher generation), but sizable fractions are married to im- 
migrants and to members of the second generation of the same “ethnic” 
1 1. Age-adjusted employment rates for men in the three generational groups are very simi- 
12. This appears to be inconsistent with evidence from Canada. See Baker and Benjamin 
13. The wage quartiles are calculated using the pooled sample of working natives. immi- 
lar over the sample period. 
(1997). 
grants, and second generation (by gender). The More Things Change  237 
group.I4  Interestingly, second-generation men have a slightly higher likeli- 
hood of marrying a native than second-generation women. 
6.4.2  Relative Wages of Immigrants and Second Generation over Time 
As we have noted, comparisons between the relative earnings of natives, 
immigrants, and the second generation are complicated by changes in the 
relative age distributions of the three groups. A second confounding fac- 
tor is the changing geographic distribution of  immigrants versus natives. 
In 1940, immigrants and the second generation were highly concentrated 
in the northeastern  states: 54 percent of immigrants  and 45 percent  of 
second-generation adults lived in the Northeast, versus 21 percent of na- 
tives. By the mid-1990s immigrants were still slightly more likely to live in 
the Northeast than natives (23 percent of immigrants versus 19 percent of 
natives), but the Pacific region had become a more important immigrant 
focus: 38 percent of immigrants and 28 percent of the second generation 
lived in the Pacific states compared to only 13 percent of adult natives. 
Since wages vary systematically across regions, shifts in the geographic 
distribution of immigrants or second-generation individuals relative to na- 
tives would be expected to shift relative wages. 
In an effort to parse out the effects of the changing age and geographic 
distributions among the three generational groups, we performed the sim- 
ple exercise summarized in table 6.2. We first calculated the joint distribu- 
tions of age and region for each of the three generational groups in 1940, 
1970, and 1994-96  (using five 10-year age intervals and three geographic 
areas). We then developed a set of weights for the immigrant and second- 
generation samples in each year that would “reweight” these samples to 
have the same joint distribution as natives. Finally, we calculated the distri- 
butions of log weekly wages for the reweighted samples and constructed 
the differences relative to natives presented in the right-hand columns of 
the table.I5 
The effects of the adjustment procedure  on the wage distributions of 
immigrant men are illustrated in figure 6.2. For reference, panel A of the 
figure presents  the  densities  of  log weekly  wages  of  third-and-higher- 
generation men in 1940, 1970, and 1994-96. The other three panels show 
the densities of log wages for immigrant men, before and after reweighting 
the samples to have the same age and regional distributions as native men. 
As expected, the adjustments are most significant in  1940, when immi- 
grants were  older and more heavily concentrated in high-wage regions 
14. In the 1970 census we  can only determine the place of birth of fathers. We  therefore 
classify all second-generation men and women by  the country of origin of their fathers. 
IS.  This procedure can be interpreted as a generalization of the traditional Oaxaca-style 
regression adjustment method. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) develop more general 
reweighting methods that can be applied with continuous covariates. 238  David Card, John DiNardo, and Eugena Estes 
Table 6.2  Characteristics of Adjusted Log Wage Distributions 
Differences Relative to 
Adjusted Distributions of  3rd+ Generation 
3rd+  2nd  2nd 
Generation  Immigrants  Generation  Immigrants  Generation 
1940 























































































































































Notes: All data pertain to average weekly wages in 1995 dollars. The wage distributions of immigrants 
and second generation have been reweighted (by age and region cell) using relative weights that give 
the immigrant and second generation samples the same  joint distribution of age and region as the third- 
and-higher-generation group. See text. 
than natives. The effect of reweighting works in a similar direction in 1970 
but is of a much smaller magnitude, whereas in the 1994-96  sample, the 
adjustments are trivial. 
The results in table 6.2 point to two main conclusions. First, controlling 
for age and region, the relative wages of immigrants declined substantially 
between 1940 and the mid-1990s. For men, the difference in median wages A 
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Fig. 6.2  Estimated densities of native wages in 1940, 1970, and 1994-96  (A),  and comparisons of adjusted and 
unadjusted densities of immigrant wages (B-D) 240  David Card, John DiNardo, and Eugena Estes 
between immigrants and natives declined by  13 percentage points between 
1940 and 1970, and by  another 26 percentage points between 1970 and 
1994-96.  The immigrant-native wage gap at the 25th and 75th percentiles 
also declined. For women, the difference in median wages between immi- 
grants and natives was stable between 1940 and 1970 but then declined by 
24 percentage points between 1970 and 1994-96.  Second, in  contrast to 
the pattern for immigrants, any significant decline in the relative wages of 
the second generation was confined to the lower deciles of the wage dis- 
tribution. At the median, second-generation men earned 9 percent higher 
wages than native men in  1940, 6 percent higher wages in  1970, and 6 
percent higher wages in 1994-96. At the 25th percentile, however, the sec- 
ond generation’s relative wage advantage fell from 14 percent  in  1940 to 
9 percent in 1970 to 0 in 1994-96. The pattern of wage gaps for women is 
generally  similar,  although  at  the  75th  percentile,  second-generation 
women seem to have gained relative to native women (gaps of 0 in  1940, 
3 percent in 1970, and 16 percent in  1994-96). 
6.4.3  Country-of-Origin Effects 
Many previous researchers have noted the decline in the relative earn- 
ings of immigrants portrayed in table 6.2 (see, e.g., Borjas 1994). A leading 
explanation  for this change is the shift in the source countries of  U.S. 
immigrants, associated in part with the Immigration Reform Act of 1965. 
Table 6.3 illustrates the changing composition of the immigrant stocks in 
1940, 1970, and  1994-96,  along with the corresponding changes in  the 
composition of the second-generation pool. Because of data limitations in 
the  1970 census, we  identify second-generation men and women in  this 
table and throughout the remainder of the paper with the country of ori- 
gin of their father. 
In 1940, most U.S.  immigrants were from Europe, the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, or Canada. The largest group were from Eastern Europe (34 per- 
cent), while northern and southern Europe and the U.K.-affiliated coun- 
tries (the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, Australia,  and New  Zea- 
land) each contributed about one-fifth of the total. By  1970, the fraction 
of immigrants from Europe (particularly  Eastern Europe) had declined 
substantially, while the fractions from Mexico, South and Central Amer- 
ica, and Asia had risen. These trends were amplified over the next 25 years, 
so that by the mid-1990s nearly 30 percent of immigrants were from Mex- 
ico, 25 percent  were from Central and South America, and 23  percent 
were from Asia. Immigrants from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand-who  had made up more than 20 percent of 
the immigration populations in 1940 and 1970-represent  only 6 percent 
of the 1994-96  sample. 
Changes in the composition of the second generation represent a lagged 
version of the changes for the immigrant population,  albeit with addi- Table 6.3  Country of Origin of Immigrants and Fathers of Second Generation 
1940  1970  1994-96 
2nd  2nd  2nd 
Immigrants  Generation  Immigrants  Generation  Immigrants  Generation 
1. Europe, U.K., etc. 






















































































Notes: Column entries represent the percentage of immigrants from each country or percentage of second-generation fathers from each country. Based on 
samples of men and women age 16-66  (see table 6.1 for sample sizes). 
=In  the 1940 census, a large fraction of second-generation individuals have their father’s nativity coded as “other.” 242  David Card, John DiNardo, and Eugena Estes 
tional “noise” introduced by  differential fertility  and intermarriage pat- 
terns. For example, Eastern Europeans are the largest second-generation 
group in 1970, reflecting their importance in the immigrant population a 
generation earlier.  By  the mid-l990s,  individuals of European or U.K.- 
related descent are no longer a majority of the second-generation popula- 
tion, and natives with Mexican-born  parents represent close to a quarter 
of the group. 
The potential importance of these compositional changes is explored in 
table 6.4, where we compare the education, wages, and marriage patterns 
of  immigrant  and  second-generation  men  and  women  in  four  major 
“country groups.” For reference, we  also report the outcomes for natives 
(ie., the third-and-higher generation).  Examination  of this table reveals 
substantial  heterogeneity  in  the  outcomes  of  immigrant  and  second- 
generation men and women from different country groups. For example, 
immigrants from Europe and the U.K.-related countries have consistently 
higher education and wages than immigrants from Mexico and South and 
Central America. The sons and daughters of European immigrants like- 
wise have higher education and earnings than the sons and daughters of 
Mexican  and South and Central  American  immigrants.  The changing 
gaps in education and wages between natives and immigrants are also no- 
table. In  1940, native men and women were better educated than immi- 
grants from any of the four country groups. In  1970, immigrants  from 
Asia were better educated than natives, while in 1994-96, immigrants from 
the United Kingdom and Europe and from Asia were more highly edu- 
cated than natives. Thus, the persistent gap in education between immi- 
grants and natives documented in table 6.1 is largely a result of the chang- 
ing composition of immigrant source countries. 
To further illustrate the potential effects of changing immigrant source 
countries on the wages of immigrants and second-generation individuals 
relative to natives, table 6.5 presents the mean wages from table 6.4 for 
each source country expressed as a fraction  of the corresponding mean 
for natives. The most  prominent feature of the table is the low level of 
relative wages for immigrants (and sccond-generation  individuals) from 
Mexico and South and Central America. This feature suggests that  the 
rise in the fraction of immigrants  from Mexico and South and Central 
America over the past half-century would be expected to generate a de- 
cline in the relative economic status of immigrants as a whole. A second 
interesting aspect of table 6.5 is the time pattern of relative wages for im- 
migrant and second-generation men and women from Mexico and South 
and Central America. Relative wages of these groups rose from 1940 to 
1970 and then fell between 1970 and 1994-96. This inverted-U trend paral- 
lels the trend in overall wage inequality for natives (see fig. 6.2 and table 
6.1). One explanation for this parallelism is the fact that the relative wages 
of low-wage groups will tend to rise as overall wage inequality falls (as it Table 6.4  Comparisons of Education, Earnings, and Marriage Patterns of Natives, Immigrants, and Second-Generation Men and Women 
Men  Women 
Weekly  Married to 
Wage  Immigrant  Education  Wage  Immigrant 
Weekly  Married to 
Education 
1940 
Europe, U.K., etc. 
Mexico, Central/South America 
Asia 
Caribbean, Africa, other 
Natives 
Europe, U.K., etc. 
Mexico, Central/South America 
Asia 
Caribbean, Africa, other 
Natives 
Europe, U.K., etc. 
Mexico, Central/South America 
Asia 




















A.  Immigranis versus Natives 
324  64.1 
195  61.6 
248  74.7 
254  58.5 
266  2.0 
762  52.1 
526  60.7 
650  69.3 
581  74.2 
635  2.0 
759  62.3 
366  84.3 
646  91.7 
587  77.1 













































3.0 Table 6.4  (con  t inued) 
Men  Women 
Weekly  Married to  Weekly  Married to 
Education  Wage  Immigrant  Education  Wdge  Immigrant 
1940 
Europe, U.K., etc. 
Mexico, CentrallSouth America 
Asia 
Caribbean, Africa, other 
Natives 
Europe, U.K., etc. 
Mexico, Central/South America 
Asia 
Caribbean, Africa, other 
Natives 
Europe, U.K., etc. 
Mexico, CentrallSouth America 
Asia 




B. Second Generation versus Natives 
9.4  310  10.6 
5.7  138  24.5 
10.7  258  12.4 
8.7  290  4.4 
8.9  266  2.0 
11.3  818  6.9 
8.7  57 1  18.1 
12.3  782  15.8 
10.9  742  7.9 
11.2  635  2.0 
13.8  773  9.1 
11.7  434  30.7 
13.5  594  34.2 
13.2  62 1  19.9 














































Notes: Columns show mean education, mean average weekly wage, and percentage of group married to immigrants (among those married). Samples consist 
of immigrants and second-generation  men and women age 16-66. The More Things Change  245 
Table 6.5  Mean Weekly Wages Relative to Natives by  Origin Group 
Immigrants  Second Generation 
1940  1970  1994-96  1940  1970  1994-96 
A. Men 
Europe, U.K.,  etc.  1.22  1.20  1.22  1.17  1.29  1.24 
Mexico, CentraVSouth America  0.73  0.83  0.59  0.52  0.90  0.70 
Asia  0.93  1.02  1.04  0.97  1.23  0.96 
Caribbean and other  0.95  0.91  0.95  1.09  1.17  1  .oo 
B. Women 
Europe, U.K., etc.  1.09  1.09  1.12  1.12  1.14  1.23 
Mexico, CentraliSouth America  0.83  0.93  0.69  0.54  0.94  0.78 
Asia  1.20  1.16  1.15  1.07  1.22  1.17 
Caribbean and other  0.91  1.05  0.99  1.03  1.14  1.06 
Notes; Entries represent ratio of mean weekly wages of origin group to mean weekly wages of natives. 
Origin groups of second generation are based on father’s country of birth. 
did between 1940 and 1970) and fall as overall inequality rises (as it did 
between 1970 and the mid-1  990s). Whatever the explanation, examination 
of table 6.5 suggests that some of the decline in wages of immigrants as a 
whole between 1970 and 1994-96  may be attributable to a deterioration 
of the relative earnings of Mexican and South and Central American im- 
migrants. 
We  can employ the same reweighting techniques used  in table 6.2 to 
more formally evaluate the effects of changing source country composi- 
tion on the changing relative earnings of immigrants and second-gener- 
ation individuals. To fix ideas, consider the change in the median log wage 
of immigrants relative to natives between 1940 and 1970. Let m(Imm, 70) 
denote the median wage of immigrants in 1970, and let m(Native, 70) de- 
note the median wage of natives. Using this notation, the change in the 
immigrant-native wage gap between 1940 and 1970 is 
D  =  m(Imm,70) - m(Native,70) - [m(Imm,40) - m(Native,40)]. 
The wage distributions of natives and immigrants may change for a vari- 
ety of reasons, including changes in the age and geographic distribution of 
the  two  populations,  and changes  in the relative fractions  of  specific 
immigrant-origin groups. Let m(Irnm, 40170) denote the median log wage 
of immigrants when the sample of  1940 immigrants is reweighted to have 
the same joint distribution of age, region, and immigrant source countries 
as in 1970, and let m(Native, 40170) denote the median log wage of natives 
when the sample of 1940 natives is reweighted to  have the same joint distri- 
bution of age and region as in 1970. The relative change D can be decom- 
posed as 
D =  D,  +  D,, 246  David Card, John DiNardo, and Eugena Estes 
where 
D,  =  m(Imm,70) - m(Native,70) 
- [m(  Imm, 40 170) -.  m(  Native, 40 I70)] 
and 
D2  =  rn(Imm, 40170) - m(Native, 40170) 
- [m(Imm,  40) - rn(Native, 40)]. 
The first of these components represents the change in relative wages that 
would have occurred if there had been no change in the age or geographic 
distributions of natives or immigrants and no change in the origin com- 
position of immigrants. The second component represents the difference 
between  the “counterfactual”  immigrant-native  wage gap in  1940 (con- 
structed to have the 1970 joint distribution of age, region, and immigrant 
composition) and the actual immigrant-native wage gap in that year. 
The elements  of D,  are displayed in table 6.6. In this table, the wage 
distributions for natives, immigrants, and second-generation individuals 
have all been calculated using weights that standardize the joint distribu- 
tions of age (across five age intervals), region (across three regions) and 
country-of-origin  group (across four country groups) back to their  1970 
values. (Thus, the 1970 medians, quartiles,  and standard deviations are 
simply the “raw” statistics for the respective  generational  groups.) The 
wage gaps relative to natives in the two right-hand columns of the table 
represent  the differences that would  have  been  observed  under  the as- 
sumption of a 1970 distribution for the covariates. Comparing these ad- 
justed wage gaps over time shows the changes in the relative wage gap 
holding constant age, region, and origin composition. 
Inspection of the adjusted wage gaps for immigrants in table 6.6 reveals 
a  remarkable  degree  of  stability over  time,  especially  compared  to the 
downward trend in table 6.2. The adjusted median immigrant-native wage 
gap for men falls from 10 percent in 1940 to 6 percent in 1970 and then 
rises slightly to 8 percent in 1994-96.  The corresponding median gap for 
women rises from 5 to 7 percent between 1940 and 1994-96. Thus, almost 
all of the measured decline in the wage gap between immigrants and na- 
tives  between  1940 and the mid-1990s  is  attributable  to the effects of 
changing characteristics of immigrants-in  particular, the changing frac- 
tion of immigrants from different groups of source countries. 
The story for the second generation is somewhat different. As is evident 
from  the  last  column  of  table  6.6, the  second  generation-native  wage 
differential (after adjusting for age, region, and origin composition) is al- 
ways large and quite substantial. At the three points in the distribution 
reported in the table, the adjusted differentials range from 17 to 57 percent 
for men and from 9 to 39 percent for women. The existence of a positive The More Things Change  247 
Table 6.6  Adjusted Log Wage Distributions, Accounting for Changes in Composition of 
Immigrant and Second-Generation  Populations 
Differences Relative to 
Adjusted Distributions of  3rd+ Generation 
3rd+  2nd  2nd 

























































































































































Notes: All data pertain to average weekly wages in 1995 dollars. The samples of immigrants and second- 
generation persons in  1940 and 1994-96  have been reweighted  to give these samples the same joint 
distribution of  age, region, and origin composition as in  1970. The samples of natives  in  1940 and 
1994-96  have been reweighted  to give these samples the same joint distribution of age and region as 
in 1970. 
adjusted wage gap between second-generation individuals and natives is 
consistent with another feature that we  will demonstrate below: Condi- 
tional on parental background, second-generation men and women have 
higher education and wages than natives. 
Reweighting the second generation in 1940 and 1995 to have the same 248  David Card, John DiNardo, and Eugena Estes 
joint distribution of age, region, and origin as the 1970 second generation 
has two important impacts on the comparison, both of which substantially 
raise the second generation-native  wage differential relative to the more 
modest values reported in table 6.2. 
First, relative to the native born, the 1970 second generation are consid- 
erably older. From table 6.1 it is evident that the mean age differential- 
which is less than one year in both 1940 and 1994-96-is  12.1 years in 
1970. Second, as is  evident from table 6.3, the  1970 second-generation 
sample includes relatively more children of immigrants from Europe and 
the United Kingdom-who  typically fare well in the U.S. labor market- 
and relatively few children of Mexican or South or Central American im- 
migrants-who  typically  fare poorly.  The  net  effect  of  “upweighting” 
older second-generation people of European descent and “downweight- 
ing” younger second-generation people of Mexican and South and Cen- 
tral American descent is particularly  striking in  1994-96.  At the lowest 
wage quartile, second-generation men in the reweighted sample earn 57 
percent more than native men, while second-generation women earn 39 
percent more than natives. 
Another notable aspect of the adjusted second generation-native  wage 
gaps in table 6.6 is their evolution over time. Over the period 1940-70,  the 
second generation-native gaps show a general decline. Among women, the 
declines are relatively modest at all points in the distribution. Among men, 
the direction and size of the movement is  sensitive to the point in the 
distribution at which the comparison is made, although, on average, the 
movements are quite modest. (Although we do not report this in table 6.6, 
the fall in the mean adjusted wage is only 3 percent.) 
More interesting is the movement in the adjusted  wage gap between 
1970 and 1994-96. Unlike the adjusted immigrant-native wage gaps, which 
were fairly stable over this period, the adjusted second generation-native 
wage gaps for men and women rose substantially: by  12-26  percent for 
men, depending on the specific quartile of the wage distribution, and by 
19-26  percent for women. Because the weighting adjustments “upweight” 
older second-generation men and women of  European descent-people 
who would tend to earn above-average wages-some  of this rise may be 
attributable  to the  rise  in  overall  wage  inequality  between  1970 and 
1994-96  rather than to any shift in the relative position of second-genera- 
tion workers in  the overall wage distribution. As a mechanical matter, a 
rise in  overall inequality will  tend  to increase the measured  wage gaps 
between the percentiles of the native wage distribution and the percentiles 
of a sample of relatively high-wage second-generation workers. 
An important conclusion that emerges from table 6.6 is that the stability 
of  the wage gaps for second-generation workers that we  documented in 
table 6.2 should be seen as rather surprising, given the changing age and 
ethnic composition of the second-generation sample between 1970 and the The More Things Change  249 
mid-1990s and the trend toward widening wage inequality in the economy 
as a whole. Despite the rising fractions of second-generation men  and 
women of non-European heritage, and the falling relative age of second- 
generation  workers,  they  have  more  or less  maintained  their  relative 
wage advantage. 
6.5  Intergenerational Assimilation 
6.5.1  Conceptual Issues 
While some immigrants are quite similar to natives, others differ from 
native-born people in important ways, such as native tongue and level and 
type of schooling. These differences may be  transmitted  to the second 
generation through a variety of mechanisms, including passive channels 
(such as the home environment) and active channels (such as decisions 
about schooling).16  In fact, simple comparisons of second-generation men 
and women from different backgrounds, such as those in tables 6.4 and 
6.5, suggest that the native-born children of immigrants with higher levels 
of education and earnings tend to have significantly higher levels of educa- 
tion and earnings. This should not be surprising, since even within the 
native population there is a relatively high “intergenerational correlation” 
between the education and earnings levels of  parents and their children 
(see Solon [1999] for a recent review). 
The strength of the connection between the economic performance of 
immigrant parents and the outcomes of their native-born children is use- 
fully summarized by a simple descriptive model of the form: 
(1)  y, =  a +  bx,  +  el, 
where y,  is the level of education or wages of child i (adjusted for factors 
such as age), and xl  is the level of education or wages of his or her father 
(similarly adjusted). In principle, the outcomes of both the mother and 
father could  be included in this equation. For simplicity, however, and 
in recognition of the constraints imposed by  our data, we  focus on the 
connection between child and father. 
In this setup, the “intergenerational assimilation rate” is given by  1 -  b. 
To see this, note that if b = 1, then there is no intergenerational assimila- 
tion, since any difference in outcomes between a father and the underlying 
population is reproduced by  his offspring. On the other hand, if  b = 0, 
then there is complete intergenerational  assimilation, since regardless of 
the outcomes of the father, his offspring will have the mean characteristics 
of the overall population. More generally, if  0 < h < 1, then a fraction 
16. Mechanisms of  intergenerational transmission  are studied  by  Becker  and  Tomes 
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1 -  b of the difference between the father’s outcome and the population 
mean for the father’s generation is closed in the next generation. 
We  lack data on the education or earnings of the parents of second- 
generation children. Instead, following Borjas (1993), we rely on a group- 
ing estimation strategy to estimate equation (1). This method proceeds as 
follows. First, we estimate mean education or earnings levels (adjusted for 
age, etc.) for immigrant men in 1940 or 1970 by country of origin. Second, 
we estimate mean education or earnings levels (adjusted for age, etc.) for 
second-generation men  or women in  1970 or  1994-96  by  their father’s 
country of origin. Third, we  regress the mean outcomes for the second 
generation in a specific origin group on the outcomes of the immigrant 
men in the same group from the preceding census sample. There is clearly 
some slippage in this method because (for example) not all immigrant men 
in 1940 had children who appear in our sample in 1970, nor do all children 
have fathers who were potentially  sampled in  1940. The method can be 
refined to reduce this slippage by restricting the immigrant men to those 
married to immigrants and having children between the ages of 0 and 15, 
and restricting the second generation samples to individuals of the “right” 
age to match with these children. Ignoring slippage in the definitions of the 
father’s and children’s cohorts, however, this grouping method will yield 
consistent estimates of the coefficient b. 
It is interesting to ask how the degree of intergenerational correlation 
between  immigrant  fathers and their  native-born  children  might  differ 
from the degree of correlation between native fathers and their children. 
A natural assumption is that the intergenerational correlation is the same; 
that is, the rate of intergenerational assimilation between immigrants and 
the second generation is merely a particular manifestation of a more gen- 
eral process of intergenerational transmission. Solon (1 992) and Zimmer- 
man (1 992), using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the National 
Longitudinal Study of Youth, respectively, for example, estimate several 
different variants  of equation  (1)  using  samples of mainly native-born 
men. Both papers report estimates of the parameter b between 0.4 and 0.5, 
suggesting an intergenerational assimilation rate of between 0.5 and 0.6. 
There are at least two reasons why one might expect estimates of b based 
on the children of immigrants to be different from this. First, there may 
be a stronger or weaker connection between the observed characteristics 
of an immigrant father and the true underlying characteristics of the fam- 
ily.  For example, suppose that the true model generating children’s out- 
comes includes both the father’s and mother’s education (or wages): 
y, =  u +  bx,  +  czI +  e,, 
where z, is the mother’s outcome. In this case, a regression of the child’s 
outcomes on the father’s will yield a coefficient with probability limit The More Things Change  251 
Cov(x,  3 z,  1  b+  c 
Var(x,) 
Thus, if immigrant parents are more likely to have similar economic out- 
comes or levels of education than native-born parents, our estimates of 
b will  be higher than those calculated from a similar regression on the 
general population. 
A second reason is the possibility of  “ethnic human capital” that has 
been  raised by  Borjas (1992), among others. The ethnic human capital 
model specifies that the outcome of a child may be affected by  the edu- 
cation or economic well-being of  other parents from the same country 
of origin, perhaps because of “neighborhood effects.” To  formalize this 
model, we distinguish between individuals (indexed by  i)  and origin groups 
(indexed by j).  A model with ethnic human capital specifies that 
where yIJ  is the outcome for child i in group j;  xIJ  is the outcome of his or 
her  father; and xJ is the mean  outcome of  origin group j. A  standard 
microlevel regression of ylJ  on xIJ  will yield a coefficient with probability 
limit 
and will be upward biased for b if d > 0. If ethnic human capital effects 
are larger for the children of immigrants than for other children (because 
immigrants are more likely to live in enclaves, or because immigrant’s chil- 
dren are more strongly affected by  their parents’ peer  group), then the 
upward  bias will  be bigger  for second-generation children  than for the 
general population, leading to a higher intergenerational correlation. 
Moreover, the use of grouped estimation strategy will exacerbate this 
bias. To  see this, note that equation (2) implies that the probability limit 
of the coefficient from a regression of yJ on xJ is b + d, which is greater 
than b + d [Var(x,)]l[Var(x,,)],  since Var(xJ) <  Var(xtJ).  A similar argument 
suggests that the bias induced by any unobserved error component in the 
residual e,,J  that happens to be correlated with xJ will be accentuated in the 
grouped regression relative to a microlevel regression. 
A final aspect of the grouped estimation strategy is that it “solves” the 
attenuation problem that arises in the corresponding microlevel regression 
if parental outcomes are reported with error, or if income is measured in 
only one year but a father’s permanent income is the conceptually appro- 
priate determinant of his children’s SUCC~SS.’~  To  see this, note that any 
17. This point is emphasized by  Solon (1992, 1999) and Zimmerman (1992). 252  David Card, John DiNardo, and Eugena Estes 
individual-specific  transitory income fluctuations or measurement  errors 
are “averaged out” of the mean for the origin group. Thus, intergenera- 
tional correlations of income obtained from a grouped estimation method 
are most comparable to the estimates obtained from microlevel regressions 
that use instrumental variables methods or multiple years of data to isolate 
the correlation between children’s outcomes and their father’s permanent 
income. 
6.5.2  Estimation Results 
We applied the grouped estimation method described above to estimate 
intergenerational correlations between immigrant fathers in 1940 and 1970 
and second-generation sons and daughters in 1970 and  1994-96.  We  fo- 
cus on two outcomes for fathers-mean  education and mean log weekly 
wages-and  three  outcomes  for  children-mean  education,  mean  log 
weekly wages, and a measure  of marriage  assimilation described below. 
Given the sample sizes available in our data sets, we  aggregated  some 
countries into groups and arrived at a total of 34 countries (or country 
groups) between 1940 and 1970, and 33 countries (or country groups) be- 
tween 1970 and 1994-96.  The countries are listed in table 6A.  1, along with 
the outcome measures we use. 
For the immigrant fathers, we constructed age- and region-adjusted ed- 
ucation and earnings outcomes for each country of origin by  regressing 
education or log weekly earnings on origin dummies, region dummies, and 
origin dummies interacted with age and age-squared.I8 We  then used the 
estimated age profiles to obtain predicted education or earnings levels for 
each origin group at age 40. As described in the data section, we use all 
available observations in the 1940 census (not just the sample-line individ- 
uals) and two 1 percent samples of the 1970 census to obtain more reliable 
estimates of the outcomes of immigrant fathers. For the second-generation 
sons and daughters we  constructed age- and region-adjusted  education 
and earnings outcomes by regressing education or log weekly earnings on 
origin dummies, region dummies, and a quadratic age fun~ti0n.l~  We then 
predicted education or earnings levels for each origin group at age 40. 
Our estimates of the intergenerational correlations in wages and educa- 
tion are presented in table 6.7, while figures 6.3 and 6.4 plot the adjusted 
wages of second-generation sons and daughters against the adjusted wages 
of immigrant men. Inspection of the estimation  results and figures sug- 
gests that there are strong links between the education  and earnings of 
immigrant fathers and the outcomes of their native-born children. Coun- 
tries with higher  immigrant earnings (such as Germany and the United 
18. We  restricted our attention to men age 24-66  in order to help stabilize the estimates. 
19. As with the immigrant  fathers, we  restricted our attention to men and women age 
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Table 6.7  Relationship between Education and Earnings of Immigrant Fathers and Education 
and Earnings of Second-Generation  Sons and Daughters 
Second-Generation Sons  Second-Generation Daughters 
Education  Log Wage  Education  Log Wage 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
A. 1940-70 
~  -  0.02  -  Mean education  0.41  -  0.03  0.47 
(0.08)  (0.01) 
-~  4.78  -  0.21 
R2  0.35  0.60  0.24  0.72  0.51  0.69  0.12  0.25 
B. 1970-95 
Mean education  0.43  -  0.06  ~~  0.42  __  0.05  - 
Mean log wage  -  4.50  -  0.62  -  4.05  -  0.50 
R2  0.68  0.56  0.51  0.45  0.76  0.54  0.54  0.33 
of fathers  (0.10)  (.01) 
Mean log wage  -  4.74  -  0.44 
of fathers  (0.68)  (0.05)  (0.56)  (0.06) 
of fathers  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
of fathers  (0.72)  (0.12)  (0.67)  (0.13) 
Notes: Estimated on immigrant group-level means using weighted least squares. Groups are indentified 
by  father’s country of origin. Education and wage outcomes are adjusted for age (see text). There are 
34 country of origin groups in the 1940-70  analysis and 33 in the 1970-95  analysis. Group weight is 
the sum of the number of sons and daughters (age 24-66)  observed for the group. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
Kingdom) have higher second-generation earnings, while countries with 
lower immigrant earnings (notably Mexico) have lower second-generation 
earnings. Using education as the outcome measure for fathers and chil- 
dren, the estimates of  the intergenerational coefficient b in equation (1) 
are very stable, with a range from 0.41 to 0.47. Using wages as the out- 
come measure the estimates of b are more variable, ranging from 0.21 to 
0.62. The relatively  low  coefficient  for  second-generation daughters  in 
1970 may  reflect the fact that  many women in this cohort had limited 
attachment to the labor market.2o  By comparison, the coefficient for the 
later sample of daughters is  much larger and closer to the estimate for 
sons. 
Table 6.7 also reports regressions of the second generation’s education 
(or earnings) on the father’s earnings (or education). The coefficients link- 
ing father’s wages to children’s education are large and relatively stable 
over time. The coefficients linking father’s education to children’s earnings 
are more variable, although for both sons and daughters the coefficient 
seems to have risen between 1970 and 1994-96.  This is consistent with the 
relatively stable intergenerational correlations of education shown in table 
20. In addition, unlike the other estimates we  report, the results for the wages of second- 
generation daughters in 1970 are very sensitive to whether or not weights are used in esti- 
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Fig. 6.3  Intergenerational correlations between the wages of immigrant fathers in 
1940 and the wages of second-generation sons (A)  and daughters (B)  in  1970 
Nore: A,  weighted OLS regression line shown, slope = 0.44; B, weighted OLS regression line 
shown, slope = 0.21. 
6.7, along with the well-known  rise in the economic payoff to education 
over the past 25 years. 
Although they are not used in the estimation, we have added the data 
for native fathers and their children to figures 6.3 and 6. 4. An interesting 
feature of all four graphs is that native children earn 15120 percent less The More Things Change  255 
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Fig. 6.4  Intergenerational correlations between the wages of immigrant fathers in 
1970 and the wages of second-generation sons (A)  and daughters (B)  in  199496 
Note: A,  weighted OLS regression line shown, slope = 0.62; B, weighted OLS regression line 
shown, slope = 0.50. 
than one would expect, given their fathers' earnings and the patterns for 
second-generation children. A similar feature is evident for education: Na- 
tive men and women have 0.8 to 1.4 fewer years of education than would 
be predicted form their fathers' education level and the pattern of second- 
generation education outcomes. An implication of this gap is that even if 256  David Card, John DiNardo, and Eugena Estes 
Table 6.8  Further Evidence on the Relation between Immigrant Fathers and 
Outcomes of Second-Generation Sons and Daughters 
Second-Generation  Second-Generation 
Sons  Daughters 
Education  Log Wage  Education  Log Wage 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Mean education 
of fathers 


















































Notes: Estimated on immigrant group-level means using weighted least squares. Groups are 
indentified by father’s country of origin. Education and outcomes are adjusted for age (see 
text). There are 34 country of origin groups in the 1940-70  analysis and 33 in the 1970-95 
analysis. Group weight is the sum of the number of sons and daughters (age 24-66)  observed 
for the group. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
immigrants have somewhat lower education or earnings than natives, their 
children will surpass the children of natives.*’ 
A question raised by the estimated models in table 6.7 is whether the 
education and earnings of second-generation children are more strongly 
affected by the education or earnings of their fathers. To answer this ques- 
tion, we fit the models in table 6.8, which include both outcome measures 
for the fathers. For the 1940-70 generation, the data suggest that a father’s 
earnings are more important than his education, although both variables 
are significant in the model for second-generation daughters’ education. 
In contrast,  the data for the  1970-95  generation  suggest that a father’s 
education is the key determinant of the second generation’s success. Hold- 
ing constant  education, differences in father’s earnings exert no signifi- 
cant effect on the second generation’s education or earnings outcomes. We 
are unsure whether this difference between  the 1940-70  cohort and the 
21. We  have checked this implication using micro data from the pooled 1977-96  General 
Social  Survey,  which  contains information on  father’s education and nativity  for about 
15,300 men and women. A regression of education on father’s education, age controls, and 
dummies for immigrants and second-generation individuals yields a coefficient of 0.31 on 
father’s education and 0.79 (standard error 0.12) on the second generation dummy. We sus- 
pect that the father’s education coefficient is biased down by  about 20 percent by  measure- 
ment error. If we  force the coefficient on father’s education to equal 0.40, the estimated 
second generation dummy rises to 0.90 years (standard error 0.12). The More Things Change  257 
1970-95  cohort reflects changes in behavior, changes in the economic im- 
portance of education, or changes in the relative reliability of measured 
education and earnings differences across different immigrant groups in 
the 1940 and 1970 censuses. 
Another question raised by the findings in table 6.7 is whether all of the 
effect of father’s education or earnings is  subsumed in  the educational 
attainment of the second generation, or whether father’s outcomes exert 
an independent effect on the wages of the second generation, controlling 
for the second generation’s education. To  answer this question, we  fit a 
series of models for the wages of the second generation that included the 
education of the second generation and outcomes of the fathers. The re- 
sults are summarized in table 6.9. Columns (1) and (5) of the table show 
simple models that include only the second generation’s education. These 
estimates tend to be only slightly higher than corresponding microlevel 
estimates fit to the same samples of second-generation men and women in 
1970 and 1994-96.**  The models in the other columns add father’s wages 
and  education, alone and together, to this basic  specification. For  the 
1940-70  cohort, there is some indication that even controlling for the sec- 
ond generation’s education, father’s wages and education matter. However, 
the signs of the effects differ between second-generation sons and daugh- 
ters. For the 1970-95  cohort, on the other hand, the father outcome vari- 
ables arc individually (and jointly)  insignificant determinants of wages, 
controlling for the education of the second generation. 
Taken in combination with the findings in table 6.8, the results for the 
most recent cohort in table 6.9 point to a very simple model of the inter- 
generational transmission mechanism. According to the estimates in table 
6.8, only father’s education matters in the education or wage outcomes of 
the 1970-95  second generation cohort. Moreover, fathers’ outcomes only 
directly affect the education of the second generation in this cohort. For 
this cohort, at least, the strong intergenerational linkages between immi- 
grant fathers and their native-born children work only through education. 
6.5.3  Marriage Assimilation 
A different perspective on intergenerational assimilation is provided by 
the marriage patterns of second-generation sons and daughters. A child 
of immigrants can either marry a native, another child of immigrants, or 
an immigrant. A simple index of “marriage assimilation” is the fraction 
of second-generation men or women who marry natives, minus the frac- 
tion who marry immigrants. This index treats marriage to natives as a 
“positive” outcome and marriage to immigrants as a “negative” outcome. 
22. The corresponding microlevel returns to education (controlling for a cubic in experi- 
ence) for the second-generation samples are 0.064 (men, 1970); 0.065 (women, 1970); 0.121 
(men, 1994-96);  and 0.102 (women, 1994-96). Table 6.9  Effects of Own Education and Father’s Wages and Education on Average Weekly Earnings of Second-Generation  Sons and Daughters 
Second-Generation Sons  Second-Generation Daughters 




















































0.71  0.88  0.92  0.62  0.70 
Mean education 
of group 




































0.74  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.75 
Nofes: See notes to table 6.7. Dependent variable is mean log weekly earnings of second-generation sons or daughters (age 24-66).  Standard errors are 
in parentheses. The More Things Change  259 
We  used information on the nativity of the spouses of married second- 
generation individuals in each of the origin groups analyzed in tables 6.7- 
6.9 to construct the marriage assimilation index. We then plotted the index 
for each origin group against the levels of education and wages of immi- 
grant fathers, and fit the regression models shown in table 6.10. 
Despite its ad hoc nature, the marriage index is very highly correlated 
with other measures of second generation success. As shown in figure 6.5, 
the sons and daughters of better-educated immigrant fathers have higher 
marriage assimilation indexes. Closer inspection of the data for individual 
countries revealed an exception to this general pattern for the children of 
immigrants from Asian countries. For example, second-generation Japa- 
nese children had very low marriage assimilation rates in 1970, despite the 
relatively high level of their father’s education (see fig. 6.5). This impres- 
sion is confirmed by  the regression models in table 6.10, which show a 
substantial improvement in fit once an indicator for Asian origin groups 
is added. 
As with the education and earnings outcomes of the second generation, 
there are some differences in the effects of father’s education and wages 
for different cohorts of second-generation children. The effects of father’s 
education on marriage assimilation  rates are similar between men and 
women and are fairly stable over time (see cols. [2] and [6]). By  compar- 
ison, the effects of father’s earnings increase substantially  between  the 
1940-70  cohort and the 1970-95 cohort. Moreover, in the earlier cohort, 
father’s education seems to matter more than father’s earnings, while in 
the later cohort, the reverse is true. Nevertheless, the marriage patterns of 
second-generation men and women generally confirm the existence of a 
strong linkage between the economic well-being of immigrant fathers and 
the degree of assimilation achieved by their children. 
6.5.4  Comparison with Previous Estimates 
How do our estimates of the degree of intergenerational correlation be- 
tween immigrant fathers and their  native-born  children  compare with 
other estimates? Our most easily compared estimates are those based on 
the log wages of the two generations. Like Borjas (1993), who analyzed 
the intergenerational correlation between immigrant fathers in  1940 and 
second-generation sons in  1970, we  find fairly high correlations between 
the earnings of immigrants fathers and their children: in the range of 0.4 
to 0.6. These are on the high  side of estimates in the intergenerational 
correlation literature, potentially for the reasons discussed earlier. 
The intergenerational correlations of education are lower and more sta- 
ble (in the range of 0.40 to 0.45). A reasonable benchmark for comparison 
with these estimates is obtainable from the General Social Survey (GSS), 
which collects a yearly sample of data on adult household heads, including 
information on their father’s education. Using the  1972-96  samples for Table 6.10  Relationship between Education and Earnings of Immigrant Fathers and Marriage Assimilation of Second-Generation  Sons 
and Daughters 
Second-Generation Sons  Second-Generation Daughters 





























































































0.46  0.24  0.16 
Notes: Dependent variable is the fraction of married second-generation sons or daughters whose spouse is third or higher generation, minus the fraction 
whose spouse is an immigrant. Estimated on immigrant group-level means using weighted least squares. Groups are identified by father’s country of origin. 
There are 34 country of origin groups in the 1940-70  analysis and 33 in the 1970-95  analysis. Group weight is the sum of the number of sons and daughters 
(age 24-66)  observed for the group. Standard errors are in parentheses. The More Things Change  261 
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generation sons (A)  and daughters (B)  in 1970 
men and women who reported their father’s education (a total sample of 
19,520 observations), we  regressed each person’s education on their fa- 
ther’s education, dummies for gender and sample year, and a cubic func- 
tion of age. The estimated coefficient is 0.318 (standard error 0.005); the 
model explains about 25 percent of the variance in education. While this 
estimate is lower than the ones in table 6.7, it is important to account for 262  David Card, John DiNardo, and Eugena Estes 
the potential effects of measurement error. Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) 
study the correlation  in twins’ reports of their parents’ education, and 
estimate that the reliability of father’s education is about 0.80. Combining 
this estimate with the GSS estimate, a microlevel regression for the effect 
of father’s education on his son’s or daughter’s education implies an effect 
of 0.40 (= 0.318/.80). This estimate is remarkably close to our estimates 
based on the correlation between the education of second-generation men 
and women of different ancestries and the education of immigrant men in 
the same origin groups 25 or 30 years earlier. 
6.5.5  Assessment 
What do the intergenerational  models in tables 6.7-6.10  imply about 
changes in the rate of intergenerational assimilation over time? On the one 
hand, our estimates of the intergenerational transmission of educational 
attainment (cols. [I], [2], [5],  and [6] in table 6.7) show remarkable stability 
between  1940-70  and 1970-95.  Based on these patterns, one might con- 
clude that rates of intergenerational assimilation have not changed much. 
On the other hand, the implied estimates of the intergenerational assimilu- 
tion coefficient for wages are uniformly lower in 1970-95  than in 1940-70. 
Thus, the intergenerational patterns of wages suggest that children of the 
immigrants born in the early part of this century assimilated faster than 
the children of the immigrants born in the later part of this century. In- 
deed, the magnitude of the estimates of the effect of the father’s wage in 
1970 on the wages of his son or daughter in 1995 is more than twice as 
large as the effect of the father’s wage in 1940 on the wages of his son or 
daughter in 1970. 
Any comparison of rates of intergenerational assimilation based on pat- 
terns of wages must be interpreted very carefully, however, in light of the 
recurring “theme” throughout this paper that the status of specific groups 
may be affected by overall shifts in wage inequality over time. If the disper- 
sion in overall wages is changing over time, then the measured  rate of 
intergenerational assimilation may change even if there are no changes in 
the relative ranking of second-generation workers in the overall wage dis- 
tribution. 
This point is illustrated in the following simple model. Let wL,  and w, 
represent the mean wages of  first- and second-generation workers from 
family or ethnic group i, and assume that The More Things Change  263 
where z,, and z,,  refer to some latent index of “human capital” of the two 
groups, and y1  and y2  refer to the rates of transformation between human 
capital and observed wages for the first and second generation (or, loosely, 
the “prices” of human capital faced by members of the first and second 
generation). A larger value for y implies that for a given distribution of z, 
the observed distribution of wages is more unequal. 
In this one-factor model, one minus the intergenerational assimilation 
coefficient (the simple regression coefficient from a regression of child’s 
wage on parent’s wage) is equal to 
C0V(Y,,WL2) - Y,1YrzCoV(z,l,  z,,)  Yo 
Var(W#  I)  (  Y,  1)’  Var( z,  1)  Y,I 
-  =  -p. 
It is therefore apparent that the magnitude of the measured intergenera- 
tional assimilation rate will vary as the variance of wages conditional on 
the single factor varies. In particular, if the distribution of wages is more 
unequal for parents than for children-the  case for 1940 parents and their 
offspring in  1970-the  rate of assimilation will  be faster than when the 
distribution of wages is more unequal for the children than the parents- 
the case for 1970 immigrants and their offspring in 1995. 
Moreover, under the assumption that the variance of the latent variable 
z has been constant across time, we can test the hypothesis that the inter- 
generational transmission process has remained unchanged  over the pe- 
riod  1940-96.  Given the simple one-factor model described above, a test 
for constancy involves a comparison of the simple correlation coefficient 
r across time, where 
which does not depend on the values taken by y. 
For men, the value of p is 0.847 in 1970-40 and 0.853 in 1995-70.  The 
comparable values for women are 0.503 and 0.575, respectively. At any 
conventional level of significance, the equality of p in the two time periods 
cannot be rejected for either men or women.23  Given the substantial social, 
political, and economic changes over the last half-century, the relative sta- 
bility of the intergenerational correlation in wages is noteworthy. We con- 
clude that  the fundamental determinants  of the rate  of assimilation of 
immigrant children have not changed much, although the measured par- 
23. We  performed the test by  using Fisher’s transformation: z  = .5 log [(I  + p)/(l  -p)], 
which under suitable conditions is distributed normally with variance approximately equal 
to I/(n -  3). 264  David Card, John DiNardo, and Eugena Estes 
tial  correlations  between  the  wages  of  immigrant  children  and  their 
second-generation children have been affected by changes in overall wage 
inequality. 
6.6  Conclusions 
We  have used data from thc 1940 and 1970 censuses and the 1994-96 
Current Population Surveys to construct an economic history of the labor 
market  status of immigrants and their  children.  Our main findings  are 
easy to summarize: Despite changes in the legal environment for immigra- 
tion and major changes in the origin countries of immigrants, the relative 
status of immigrant children has been remarkably constant. Indeed, we 
find that the rate of intergenerational “assimilation” in educational attain- 
ment has remained stable over the last 50 years and that the rate of inter- 
generational “assimilation” in earnings has also remained constant, apart 
from an effect of widening overall wage inequality. 
A related finding is that the children of immigrants tend to have notice- 
ably higher education and wages than the children of natives, controlling 
for parental background. This gap accounts for the relatively high labor 
market status of the second generation today, even though an increasing 
fraction of today’s second generation are the children of immigrants from 
the lowest-paid immigrant groups. Other things equal, being a child of im- 
migrants is associated with greater socioeconomic success in the United 
States. Appendix 
Table 6A.1  Earnings, Education, and Marriage Patterns of Immigrant Men in 1940 and Second-Generation  Men and Women in  1970 
Immigrant Men Age 24-66,  1940  Second-Generation Men Age 24-66,  1970  Second Generation Women Age 24-66,  1970 
Fraction Married to  Fraction Married to  Fraction Married to 
Mean  Years  Same  Mean  Years  Same  Same2nd  Mean  Years  Same  Same2nd  3rdf 









































7.3  0.36 
6.5  0.53 
7.5  0.57 
8.6  0.31 
8.0  0.08 
5.5  0.78 
6.8  0.67 
8.9  0.41 
7.9  0.29 
6.5  0.63 
8.9  0.31 
8.6  0.48 
6.8  0.58 
1.2  0.66 
8.1  0.60 
5.1  0.68 
9.5  0.88 
4.7  0.70 


























































0.06  0.18 
0.01  0.12 
0.01  0.07 
0.07  0.10 
0.13  0.00 
0.09  0.28 
0.02  0.16 
0.00  0.04 
0.00  0.16 
0.03  0.24 
0.02  0.03 
0.02  0.05 
0.02  0.14 
0.03  0.11 
0.04  0.34 
0.14  0.56 
0.01  0.17 
0.16  0.33 


























































0.10  0.23 
0.02  0.15 
0.07  0.09 
0.05  0.13 
0.05  0.00 
0.33  0.27 
0.05  0.19 
0.01  0.06 
0.03  0.18 
0.05  0.25 
0.01  0.02 
0.04  0.08 
0.18  0.30 
0.05  0.15 
0.03  0.12 
0.11  0.39 
0.09  0.63 
0.03  0.20 



















0.38 Table 6A.1  (continued) 
Immigrant Men Age 24-66,  1940  Second-Generation Men Age 24-66,  1970  Second Generation Women Age 24-66,  1970 
Fraction Married to  Fraction Married to  Fraction Married to 
Mean  Years  Same  Mean  Years  Same  Same2nd  Mean  Years  Same  Same2nd  3rd+ 

















5.65  8.7  0.41  0.51  6.65  11.5  0.01 
5.79  8.6  0.48  0.43  6.68  12.3  0.01 
5.39  6.9  0.51  0.41  6.58  11.3  0.03 
5.15  6.5  0.08  0.89  6.35  10.5  0.14 
5.65  5 4  0.68  0.23  6.64  11.5  0.02 
5.49  4.0  0.56  0.36  6.48  9.6  0.05 
5.81  6.8  0.59  0.27  6.77  13.5  0.02 
5.52  6.4  0.49  0.36  6.62  11.4  0.04 
5.79  8.3  0.44  0.47  6.70  12.6  0.01 
5.76  9.1  0.33  0.39  6.59  12.0  0.02 
5.77  7.3  0.52  0.24  6.80  13.3  0.02 
5.59  6.2  0.69  0.29  6.65  12.4  0.02 
5.58  7.3  0.63  0.22  6.77  13.1  0.04 
5.86  9.3  0.40  0.49  6.72  12.6  0.02 
5.60  5.4  0.65  0.27  6.67  11.7  0.02 
0.13  0.72  5.78  11.3  0.05 
0.05  0.79  5.78  12.4  0.03 
0.13  0.59  5.82  11.0  0.04 
0.22  0.51  5.91  10.5  0.26 
0.28  0.45  5.84  10.9  0.04 
0.22  0.59  5.68  9.7  0.12 
0.31  0.42  5.94  12.5  0.06 
0.10  0.61  5.88  11.1  0.08 
0.07  0.71  5.86  12.7  0.03 
0.03  0.75  5.87  12.5  0.03 
0.20  0.54  5.85  11.3  0.07 
0.23  0.39  5.96  12.5  0.11 
0.04  0.75  5.85  12.3  0.03 
0.17  0.56  5.76  11.2  0.06 
0.05  0.46  5.97  12.4  0.02 
0.15  0.68 
0.08  0.67 
0.12  0.53 
0.18  0.47 
0.30  0.36 
0.23  0.46 
0.06  0.35 
0.34  0.29 
0.09  0.51 
0.10  0.67 
0.04  0.75 
0.22  0.41 
0.22  0.27 
0.05  0.70 
0.19  0.42 
Notes: For immigrant men, fraction married to “same immigrants” is the fraction of married men whose spouse is an immigrant from the same country; and fraction married to natives 
is the fraction of married men whose spouse is native born. For second-generation men and women, fraction married to “same immigrants” is the fraction of married people whose 
spouse is an immigrant from the same country as their father; fraction married to same 2nd generation is the fraction of married people whose spouse is second generation and whose 
father-in-law was born in the same country as their father; and fraction married to 3rd+ generation is the fraction of married people whose spouse is native born with native-born parents. 
Asia nec are Asian countries other than those listed separately. CentrallSouth America nec are countries in Central or South America not listed separately. Europe nec are European 
countries not listed separately, plus Australia and New Zealand. CaribbeanlAfricalother includes countries in the Caribbean and Africa not listed separately, plus all other countries 
not included in other categories. Table 6A.2  Earnings, Education, and Marriage Patterns of Immigrant Men in 1970 and Second-Generation Men and Women in 1994-96 
Immigrant Men Age 24-66,  1970  Second Generation Men Age 24-66,  1994-96  Second Generation Women Age 24-66,  1994-96 
Fraction Married to  Fraction Married to  Fraction Married to 
Mean  Years  Same  Mean  Years  Same  Same2nd  Mean  Years  Same  Same2nd  3rd+ 




















(con  tinued) 
America nec 
6.68  13.4  0.42  0.27  6.59  15.2  0.16 
6.70  11.7  0.33  0.48  6.64  14.2  0.01 
6.58  11.7  0.51  0.24  6.58  13.3  0.33 
6.43  10.9  0.69  0.13  6.88  15.3  0.02 
6.44  12.6  0.68  0.20  6.53  13.8  0.00 
6.31  11.0  0.84  0.08  6.78  13.8  0.25 
6.68  12.1  0.25  0.27  6.22  14.6  0.00 
6.19  8.8  0.78  0.14  6.64  13.2  0.10 
6.47  11.9  0.52  0.26  6.45  13.3  0.44 
6.63  11.5  0.78  0.19  6.39  13.5  0.32 
6.73  12.2  0.33  0.30  6.67  15.0  0.01 
6.69  11.9  0.31  0.38  6.39  14.5  0.00 
6.78  12.4  0.45  0.29  6.80  14.8  0.02 
6.51  10.2  0.51  0.21  6.88  15.7  0.04 
6.30  13.3  0.36  0.33  6.24  14.2  0.00 
6.25  11.5  0.82  0.10  6.44  11.9  0.00 
6.67  11.9  0.37  0.26  6.94  14.9  0.00 
6.73  15.2  0.60  0.21  6.69  15.9  0.00 
0.13  0.56  6.34  14.8  0.12 
0.07  0.75  6.23  13.5  0.00 
0.00  0.44  6.56  14.0  0.03 
0.09  0.42  6.60  14.6  0.00 
0.00  0.87  6.13  13.6  0.29 
0.37  0.31  6.32  14.3  0.15 
0.00  0.85  6.39  14.1  0.00 
0.12  0.66  6.03  12.7  0.15 
0.17  0.39  6.01  13.3  0.00 
0.00  0.61  6.10  12.4  0.06 
0.01  0.84  6.14  14.5  0.01 
0.04  0.71  6.34  14.2  0.00 
0.10  0.74  6.12  14.0  0.01 
0.11  0.72  6.22  14.0  0.16 
0.00  0.46  5.59  10.7  0.00 
0.29  0.71  6.01  14.0  0.26 
0.00  0.88  6.11  13.9  0.00 




































0.43 Table 6A.2  (continued) 
Immigrant Men Age 24-66,  1970  Second Generation Men Age 24-66,  1994-96  Second Generation Women Age 24-66,  1994-96 
Fraction Married to  Fraction Married to  Fraction Married to 
Mean  Years  Same  Mean  Years  Same  Same 2nd  Mean  Years  Same  Same2nd  3rd+ 

















6.52  10.9  0.51  0.27 
6.57  9.0  0.42  0.22 
6.41  10.9  0.57  0.27 
6.66  13.8  0.56  0.16 
6 65  17.3  076  0.13 
6.16  6.0  0.54  0.25 
6.36  10.3  0.71  0.07 
6.46  10.5  0.30  0.33 
6.41  10.9  0.59  0.25 
6.57  10.3  0.41  0. 14 
6.42  7.1  0.63  0.16 
6.51  10.8  0.31  0.15 
6.78  12.8  0.34  0.42 
6.63  9.9  0.51  0.20 
















14.7  0.09 
13.7  0.02 
15.0  0.24 
14.3  0.73 
16.1  0.72 
11.9  0.25 
13.9  0.27 
0.05  0.75  6.35  14.5  0.06 
0.13  0.77  6.11  13.3  0.05 
0.00  0.27  6.46  13.0  0.29 
0.19  0.57  6.20  14.8  0.09 
0.21  0.50  5.89  11.6  0.28 
0.00  0.51  5.99  12.9  0.00 
0.00  0.28  6.18  16.6  0.00 
0.10  0.76  6.16  13.9  0.07 
0.00  0.36  6.17  13.0  0.00 
0.26  0.43  6.26  14.0  0.18 
0.10  0.77  6.16  14.2  0.02 
0.32  0.55  5.88  12.0  0.05 
0.10  0.72  6.42  15.3  om 
0.00  0.84  6.22  14.1  0.02 
0.00  0.74  6.31  14.3  0.00 
0.04  0.69 
0.21  0.63 
0.00  0.71 
0.53  0.38 
0.20  0.48 
0.00  0.48 
0.00  0.00 
0.11  0.74 
0.00  0.83 
0.23  0.50 
0.16  0.61 
0.36  0.56 
0.21  0.61 
0.00  0.88 
0.07  0.66 
Nolcx For immigraul men. fraction married to “same immigrants” is the fraction of married men whose spouse is an immigrant from the same country; and fraction married to natives 
is the fraction of married men whose spouse is native born. For second-generation men and women, fraction married to “same immigrants” is  the fraction of married people whose 
spouse is an immigrant from the same country as their father; fraction married to same 2nd generation is the fraction of married people whose spouse is second generation and whose 
father-in-law was born in the same country as their father; and fraction married to 3rd+ generation is the fraction of married people whose spouse is native born with native-born parents. 
Asia nec are Asian countries other than those listed separately. CentrallSouth America nec are countries in Central or South America not listed separately. Europe nec are European 
countries not listed separately, plus Australia and New Zealand. CaribbeadAfricalother includes countries in  the Caribbean and Africa not listed separately. plus all other countries 
not included in other categories. The More Things Change  269 
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